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FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
MARKETING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Joseph P. Griffin* 
It seems appropriate to begin this discussion of foreign governmen-
tal control of multinational corporations marketing in the United States 
by briefly reviewing the structure of the petroleum industry and the 
historical events leading to the Arab oil embargo. The traditional point 
of reference is the "Seven Sisters," the seven largest oil companies 
which together account for approximately 70 percent of the world's oil 
supply: British Petroleum, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, 
Standard Oil of California, and Texaco. Two of these seven, Royal 
Dutch/Shell and British Petroleum (BP), have a predominantly non-
American ownership. The remaining five are American owned. These 
five American owned multinational enterprises and Shell Oil Company, 
the American subsidiary of Royal Dutch/Shell have the largest shares 
of the U.S. market for petroleum products, a total of approximately 40 
percent. BP ranks seventeenth in terms of U.S. market share with 1.15 
percent of the market.' 
Each of the "Seven Sisters" has a myriad of branches and subsidi-
aries around the world which engage in exploring, producing, transport-
ing and refining crude oil, and transporting and marketing refined 
petroleum products. 2 Each also engages in numerous joint ventures with 
the other firms, especially on the exploration level. 
The focal point of foreign governmental pressure on these and 
smaller multinational oil firms is at the production level. Until 1960 the 
oil companies had little difficulty in dominating the governments of the 
non-U.S. producer nations. In that year the oil producing nations 
formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to 
prevent the oil companies from exploiting the oil producing countries by 
dealing with them individually and to curb competition which would 
cause lower prices for crude oil. 3 The OPEC countries gradually solidi-
fied their power and, in 1971, proposed a gradually increasing rate of 
"participation" by the OPEC countries in the producing companies 
operating within their boundaries. 
* Associated with Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C., and a 
member of the Bar of the District of Columbia. 
1. NATIONAL PETROLEUM NEWS, May 1973, at 111. 
2. M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET (1971); E. PENROSE, THE GROWTH OF 
FIRMS, MIDDLE EAST OIL AND OTHER ESSAYS 139-246 (1971). 
3. Statement of the Secretary General of the OPEC to the Second International 
Symposium on Energy, Rome, March 11-13, 1968 (OPEC BuLL., April 1968). 
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The importance of "participation" can be seen in the recent experi-
ences of the largest and most well-known producing company, the Ara-
bian American Oil Company (Aramco) which is chartered under the 
laws of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the world's third largest producer 
of petroleum, after the United States and Russia, and is the world's 
largest exporter of petroleum. Aramco produces 95 percent of all Saudi 
oil. 4 Until 1972 Aramco was owned by four of the largest American oil 
multinationals: Standard Oil of California (Socal), Texaco and Exxon, 
each of which owned thirty percent of Aramco's stock and Mobil, which 
owned the remaining ten percent. In 1972 the Saudi government de-
manded and received 25 percent "participation" in the affairs of the 
company. This meant that the Saudi government acquired 25 percent 
of all Aramco's assets in Saudi Arabia, including refineries, ports, ships, 
wellheads, pumping plants and offices. The Saudi government also re-
ceived 25 percent of all of the crude oil produced by Aramco, to handle 
as it saw fit. The "participation" did not give the Saudis any stock or 
assets of Aramco's American parent companies. In June 1974, the Sau-
dis increased their participation in Aramco to 60 percent. 4·1 
Before the advent of participation Aramco's policies were decided 
by a small executive committee composed of representatives from the 
parent companies. Its decisions were presented as a fait accompli to 
Aramco's board of directors which included Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the 
Saudi Oil Minister. 5 After participation was achieved Saudis were 
placed on the executive committee. 
The Saudis' successful demand for participation has recently been 
surpassed by Kuwait, the second largest exporter of petroleum, which 
demanded and received a 60 percent participation in the Kuwait Oil 
Company, which was jointly owned by Gulf Oil and British Petroleum. 
Moreover, an agreement among the OPEC countries calls for increasing 
amounts of participation in all countries until 1982 when a 51 percent 
level is scheduled to be achieved. 
Emboldened by OPEC's success in obtaining participation, the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)6 agreed 
in October 1973 to use their power over the production of oil to achieve 
their political goals vis-a-vis Israel. They agreed to take three specific 
actions: an embargo on oil sales to nations friendly to the Israelis; a 
4. See Mosley, The Richest Oil Company in the World, N.Y. Times, March 10, 1974, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 22 [hereinafter cited as MosleyJ. 
4.1. Smith, Saudis to Increase their Share in Aramco From 25% to 60%, N.Y. Times, 
June 11, 1974, at 1, col. 3. 
5. Mosley, supra note 4, at 24. 
6. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the 
United Arab Emirates. 
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reduction in the amount of oil produced from wells within their terri-
tory; and an increase in the price of crude oil. 
Before the embargo Saudi Arabia produced about 8.3 million bar-
rels of oil a day of which one million barrels were exported to the United 
States. After the embargo was imposed all shipments of oil to the United 
States were stopped and production was reduced to about six million 
barrels a day. 
For the OAPEC countries as a whole the embargo meant that U.S. 
oil imports fell from 6.5 million barrels a day in October 1973 to two 
million barrels a day in January 1974. In addition, the price increases 
for crude oil imposed by the OAPEC countries resulted in a doubling of 
prices for crude oil between October 1973 and March 1974.7 
One result of the Arab embargo was a charge by Senator Frank 
Church that the large American multinational oil companies "have in 
fact become the policing agents of the Arabs' boycott against the United 
States." The Senator also noted that the U.S. Government had permit-
ted American owned multinational oil companies to negotiate jointly 
with the producing countries without fear of prosecution under U.S. 
antitrust laws. He concluded by calling for a "great national debate" on 
what could be done to avoid future dependence on Middle Eastern oil. 8 
In the context of this symposium our debate concerns the interna-
tional law implications of the Arab oil embargo as an example of foreign 
governmental control of multinational corporations marketing in the 
United States. More particularly we must focus upon the question of 
what, if anything, U.S. courts or agencies can do to prevent the detri-
mental effects of such actions on the American economy. The answer 
to this question can be found in the rules of international law governing 
jurisdictional competence as exercised by national courts. 
I. JURISDICTION 
The merits of the two opposing interpretations of the objective terri-
torial principle of legislative jurisdiction based upon the local "effect" 
of extraterritorial conduct have been debated ad infinitum, if not ad 
nauseam, in scholarly journals. Therefore, I will devote my attention to 
the problems which arise in the context of adjudicatory jurisdiction, i.e., 
under what circumstances may the forum court assert judicial power 
over specific individuals and legal entities? 
In the oil industry, companies such as Aramco are involved only in 
7. See Tanner, Oil Shipments to U.S. Renewed by Saudi Arabia, Wall St. J., March 
26, 1974, at 2, col. 2; Smith, Saudi Oil Output Up by Million Barrels, N.Y. Times, March 
26, 1974, at 55, col. 7. 
8. Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1973, § A, at 9, col. 4; Press Release, Dec. 7, 1973 (from the 
office of Senator Frank Church). 
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producing oil. They sell it to their parent companies who process and 
sell the various petroleum products at wholesale or retail. Since the 
production companies are at the heart of the Arab embargo and reduc-
tions in production, the first question is: can these foreign subsidiaries 
or branches be brought within the legitimate jurisdictional reach of U.S. 
courts? 
In the United States this judicial power, usually referred to as in 
personam jurisdiction, is limited by the Due Process clauses of the Fed-
eral Constitution9 which permit a court to assert adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion over a defendant alien corporation only when that corporation has 
certain minimum contacts with the forum of such a nature and quality 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional American 
" . . . notions of fair play and substantial justice."10 This is a test of 
fairness in the circumstances determined by analyzing and weighing the 
competing interests of the parties, i.e., the defendant's interest in not 
being forced to defend a suit in a foreign court, the plaintiff's interest 
in vindicating his claim in the court of his choice and the public's 
interest in the issue. 
In addition to this constitutional requirement the court must assert 
its personal jurisdiction and notify the defendant corporation of the suit 
by valid service of process pursuant to relevant statutes and court rules. 
To be valid, service must be made in a manner reasonably calculated 
to notify the defendant of the proceeding and afford it a reasonable 
opportunity to appear and be heard. 11 The court must also determine 
that the venue of the suit is proper. Venue is a rule of convenience rather 
than a constitutional right that restricts the location of the trial to 
forums which are mutually convenient to parties and witnesses. 12 
An analysis of the pertinent precedents under these constitutional 
guidelines reveals that the foreign producing companies may legiti-
mately be brought within American jurisdiction in certain circumstan-
ces. In the Swiss Watch case the Justice Department contended that 
since the American parent companies carried out agreements made by 
their Swiss subsidiaries, the parent was acting as an agent of the subsid-
iary, thereby subjecting the subsidiaries to the jurisdiction of U.S. 
9. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. 
10. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ; Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); 
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUPREME CouRT REV. 241; 
Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and The Jn Personam Jurisdiction 
of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569 (1958). 
11. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S . 306 (1950). 
12. Some special venue statutes are collected in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1403 (1970); see 
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (antitrust); 46 U.S .C. § 688 (1970) (Jones Act); Note, Doing Business 
as a Test of Venue and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations in the Federal Courts, 56 
COLUM. L. REV. 394 (1956). 
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courts. The court did not specifically rule on the argument, rather it 
stated: 
Jurisdiction over the parent is not being sought through a subsidi-
ary but jurisdiction of the subsidiary is being sought through the par-
ent. We are free of the danger that a corporation may be drawn into 
litigation in a strange forum by the acts of someone relatively unfamil-
iar with its major pollcies and unimportant in its corporate hierarchy. 
Here, the court already has jurisdiction over the parental policy making 
body which gave its deliberate assent to the alleged unlawful enter-
prise.13 
The next question is whether the alien parent of an American sub-
sidiary such as Royal Dutch/Shell or British Petroleum is subject to an 
American court's adjudicatory jurisdiction. The answer here is also 
"yes." An alien parent may come within U.S. jurisdiction because of its 
own activities, because of a seizure of its property located in the United 
States, or because of its relations with American subsidiaries or affili-
ates. 
A. The Parent's Activities 
In several cases an alien corporation has been "found" in the U.S. 
forum court because of its own activities. For example, in the Alcoa case 
one of the defendants, Limited, was a Canadian holding company whose 
operations principally involved integrating the manufacturing and sell-
ing operations of its subsidiaries which were located outside the United 
States. The court found that the company was present in the Southern 
District of New York because it maintained large permanent offices and 
bank accounts in New York and because the officers of the company in 
New York arranged loans for the subsidiaries. 14 
In the Hoffman case, Alfa Romeo, an Italian company, had nego-
tiated and signed a franchise agreement in New York granting exclusive 
sales and distribution rights in the district. The court found that: "A 
foreign manufacturer of cars transacts business by promoting the sale 
of its products through a distributorship system when the manufacturer 
retains some control over the distributor." 15 
In a case which is sub judice the Department of Justice is contend-
ing that personal jurisdiction over an alien company can be based solely 
on the grounds that the alien company holds a U.S. patent. The civil 
antitrust complaint alleged that Bristol Myers Co. and Beecham Inc., 
13. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F. 
Supp. 40, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 20 F. Supp. 13, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). 
15. Hoffmann Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965). 
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both of which are American companies, and Beecham Group, Ltd. (Bee-
cham U.K.) a British company that owns 90 percent of Beecham, Inc., 
conspired to restrain and monopolize trade by fraudulently procuring 
and enforcing Beecham U.K.'s U.S. patent covering ampicillin. 16 
Essentially, the Department of Justice is contending that the use of a 
U.S. patent for purposes of restraint of trade permits a suit under the 
patent statute and gives the U.S. court jurisdiction over the alien patent 
holder because the patent statute provides in pertinent part that: 
The court shall have the same jurisdiction to take any action re-
specting the patent or rights thereunder that it would have if the 
[alienl patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the court.17 
B. Seized Property 
The Sherman 18 and Wilson Tariff'9 Acts contain forfeiture provi-
sions which have not been used since 193020 but which are sometimes 
used informally as a lever to compel alien companies to consent to a 
court's jurisdiction. In 1930 the Department of Justice issued a press 
release explaining the forfeiture provisions which stated in part that: 
. .. seizure of goods under the Wilson Tariff Act has been followed 
because the principal parties, in cases of violation of the antitrust laws 
by foreign monopolies, are beyond the jurisdiction of a court and cannot 
be reached by subpoena. 21 
C. Relation to Subsidiaries or Affiliates 
Courts have frequently utilized the process of "lifting the veil" to 
treat a local subsidiary and a foreign parent as a single entity in order 
to achieve jurisdiction over the parent. 
Two genres of lifting the veil have developed. In the first and most 
common genre the court converts two or more separate entities into a 
single entity in order to deal with the business realities or representa-
tions of the group. In the other genre of cases the court applies tradi-
tional principles of agency to the dealings between two distinct entities. 
16. United States v. Bristol Myers Co., Civil No. 822-70 (D.D.C ., filed March 19, 
1970). This case has been consolidated with several others . In re Ampicillin Antitrust 
Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 50 (D.D.C.). 
17 . 35 U .S .C . § 293 (1970) . See United States v. Glaxo, 328 F . Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 
1971); United States v. Bayer, 135 F . Supp. 65 (S.D .N .Y. 1955) . 
18. 15 U.S .C. § 6 (1970). 
19. 15 U.S.C . § 11 (1970) . 
20. United States v. ABC Canning Co., CCH FED. ANTITRUST LAWS, WITH SUMMARY 
OF CASES (1890-1951) , Case No. 374 (S .D .N.Y. 1930). 
21. Dept. of Justice Press Release, June 12, 1930. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE 
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 3.9 (2d ed. 1973). 
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One of the most famous examples of the converting two-into-one 
genre is the Swiss Watch 22 case, which involved a civil suit by the United 
States Department of Justice against several Swiss and American defen-
dants, alleging violations of the antitrust laws in that the defendants 
had unreasonably restrained trade in Swiss watches and the export of 
American watches. Two of the Swiss companies (Ebauches and FH) 
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. They 
jointly owned a small23 New York corporation (Watchmakers) whose 
budget was submitted for approval to them each year. The General 
Manager of Watchmakers submitted monthly reports of expenditures 
and activities to the parents, and much of the correspondence was con-
cerned with problems and transactions arising from repair parts manu-
factured by the parents. The court acknowledged the validity of a 1925 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court24 that "a parent's complete commer-
cial and financial domination of its subsidiary did not bring the parent 
within the jurisdiction as long as the formal separation was scrupulously 
maintained." 25 However, because Watchmakers was created to perform 
advertising, consumer liaison and promotional work for the parents and 
because of the close supervision by the parents, the court concluded that 
"realistically appraised Watchmakers has no business of its own . . . . 
It is a mere adjunct of its parents and its activities will be regarded as 
theirs. " 26 
Operation of the genre of cases based on agency theory can be seen 
in Frum mer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc. 27 Frummer, an Ameri-
can citizen, fell and injured himself in an allegedly unsafe bathtub while 
vacationing at the London Hilton Hotel. Upon returning to his New 
York residence he filed suit for personal injury in the New York state 
courts. Named as defendants were Hilton Hotels (U.K.), Ltd. (U.K. 
Hilton), a British corporation which is the lessee and operator of the 
London Hilton; Hilton Hotels International, Inc. (Hilton lnt'l), a Dela-
ware corporation which owns part of the stock of Hilton Int'l and which 
was described as the "American parent of the widespread Hilton Hotel 
enterprises. " 28 
U.K. Hilton moved for an order dismissing the complaint against 
it on the ground that the New York court lacked adjudicatory jurisdic-
22. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F. 
Supp. 40 (S.D .N.Y. 1955), reargument denied, 134 F. Supp. 710 (S .D.N.Y. 1955). 
23. Watchmakers had nine employees and an annual budget of $70,000. 133 F. Supp. 
at 44. 
24 . Cannon Mfg . Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 337 (1925). 
25 . United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 
40, 45 (S.D .N.Y. 1945). 
26 . Id. 
27. 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281N.Y.S.2d41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967). 
28. Id. at 540, 227 N .E.2d at 856, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (dissenting opinion). 
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tion because U.K. Hilton was not present in New York. The Court of 
Appeals of New York rejected U.K. Hilton's contention by a four to 
three vote. The court reasoned that the due process standard of "fair 
play and substantial justice" is a simple pragmatic one which is met 
whenever an alien corporation "is engaged in such a continuous and 
systematic course of 'doing business' here as to warrant a finding of its 
'presence' in this jurisdiction."29 It then noted that defendants Hilton 
Int'l and Hilton Corp. jointly owned Hilton Credit Corporation, one 
branch of which was the Hilton Reservation Service (Service). Service 
has a New York office and bank account and accepted and confirmed 
room reservations at the London Hilton. Service also did public rela-
tions and publicity work for U.K. Hilton and was established to generate 
business for the London Hilton. Although Service was not an employee 
of U.K. Hilton, the fact that both are owned in common by Hilton Int'l 
and Hilton Corp. "gives rise to a valid inference as to the broad scope 
of the agency in the absence of an express agency agreement . . . . " 30 
The "significant and pivotal factor" according to the court was that 
Service "does all the business which U.K. Hilton could do were it here 
by its own officials."31 Thus the presence of U.K. Hilton was established 
by the New York activities conducted on its behalf by its agent, Service. 
The court added that it was not unmindful of the burdensome inconve-
nience of litigation in a foreign country . 
. . . However, it is part of the price which may properly be demanded 
by those who extensively engage in international trade. When their 
activities abroad, either directly or through an agent, become as wide-
spread and energetic as the activities in New York conducted by U.K. 
Hilton, they receive considerable benefits from such foreign business 
and may not be heard to complain about the burdens.32 
One of the best statements of the law in this area comes from Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter, who noted that the crucial issues are questions of 
fact turning on the unique circumstances of each case and that ". . . a 
corporation can be 'found' anywhere, whenever the needs of law make 
it appropriate to attribute location to a corporation, provided that activ-
ities on its behalf that are more than episodic are carried on by its agents 
in a particular place."33 More than 20 years earlier Mr. Justice Cardozo 
wrote, 
The logical consistency of a juridical conception will indeed be 
sacrificed at times, when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some 
29. Id. at 536, 227 N.E.2d at 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 43. 
30. Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45. 
31. Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44. 
32. Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45. 
33. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 819 (1948). 
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accepted public policy may be defended or upheld. This is so 
though agency in any proper sense is lacking, where the attempted 
separation between parent and subsidiary will work a fraud upon the 
law. [citations omitted] At such times unity is ascribed to parts 
which, at least for many purposes, retain an independent life, for the 
reason that only thus can we overcome a perversion of the privilege to 
do business in a corporate form. 34 
187 
Nearly all of the pertinent cases lift the corporate veil because of 
the existence of a relationship amounting to agency or identity rather 
than for reasons of public policy. However, this distinction is rarely 
articulated and is often blurred because the forum court knows that if 
it does not lift the veil the alien will not be subject to adjudicatory 
jurisdiction anywhere in the Common Market or in the United States. 
The following facts are usually deemed relevant to the conclusion 
of presence: the amount of ownership of the subsidiary; the existence of 
common officers and/or directors; intermingling the affairs of the two 
entities as opposed to meticulous maintenance of separate accounts; tax 
returns, etc.; undercapitalization of the subsidiary; representation by 
either entity blurring the separation of the two units; an independent 
business by the subsidiary rather than the subsidiary advertising, pro-
moting or selling the parent's products; culpability because of bad faith, 
fraud, or illegality; degree of supervision of the day-to-day affairs of the 
subsidiary; and ultimate responsibility for operation of the subsidiary. 
No one of these facts is decisive and they are often cumulated to support 
the decision. Essentially the test is how distinct the two entities are 
rather than the volume of business. In the words of a Department of 
Justice memorandum to the Japanese government, "When a U.S. sub-
sidiary acts on behalf of a foreign parent, and there is such an identity 
of interest between the two or such control by one over the other that 
the one is in reality the alter ego of the other, or its mere agent, instru-
mentality or adjunct, then the parent comes within the U.S. jurisdic-
tion.":35 Most commentators36 agree that, given careful analysis of the 
34. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
35. Memorandum by Department of Justice transmitted to the Embassy of Japan, 
Washington, D.C ., with note of July 3, 1958, printed in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 118 (1968). 
It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that a stipulation 
by a subsidiary that it is the same entity as its parent is insufficient to give a court 
personal jurisdiction over the alien parent in the absence of service on the parent and an 
appearance by the parent. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S . 100 
(1969). 
36. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Extraterritorial Application of Restric-
tive Trade Legislation, REPORT OF THE 55TH CONFERENCE OF THE INT'L L. Ass'N 19, 31 (New 
York 1972); Statement of Prof. McDougal, REPORT OF THE 51ST CONFERENCE OF THE INT'L 
L. Ass'N 329 (Tokyo 1964); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 
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particular circumstances, assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction by lift-
ing the veil does not violate existing principles of international law.37 
II. DEFENSES 
Unfortunately these various methods of obtaining jurisdiction may 
prove to be insufficient in dealing with multinational oil companies and 
the OAPEC countries. This is because we must be careful to distinguish 
variations in the factual situations. For example, we must distinguish 
actions of privately owned companies acting under governmental com-
pulsion, actions not resulting from such compulsion, and actions taken 
by sovereign states or instrumentalities of such states. 
A. Sovereign Compulsion 
One district court has held that American oil companies which 
engaged in a concerted refusal to supply crude oil to an American refin-
ing company because they were ordered not to do so by the Venezuelan 
government, had a complete defense to an antitrust action brought by 
the refining company.38 Plaintiff Interamerican was an American corpo-
ration engaged in the business of processing Venezuelan crude oil at its 
bonded refinery in New Jersey. Defendants Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. and 
Monsanto Venezuela, Inc. held concessions from the Venezuelan 
government for the production of crude oil. They supplied crude oil to 
defendant Amoco Trading Company, an American company which had 
contracted to supply crude oil to Interamerican. Texaco and Monsanto 
were instructed not to ship crude oil to Interamerican by the Venezuelan 
Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, which regulates oil concession-
aires. The reasons behind this order were apparently, first, hostility 
between high Venezuelan government officials and the two principal 
stockholders of Interamerican who were Venezuelan nationals and were 
personae non gratae to the Venezuelan government. Secondly, the Vene-
zuelan government wanted to keep its crude oil from going to "unnatu-
ral" markets such as Canada and Europe. The court held that "when a 
nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. 
Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign. " 39 
Consent decrees against American-controlled oil companies and 
HAGUE RECUEIL 1, 77 (1964); Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States 
Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 157 (1957). 
37. For a more detailed review of this area, see Griffin, The Power of Host Countries 
Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in the European Economic Community and the 
United States, 6 LAW & PoL. INT'L Bus. 375 (1974) . 
38. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. 
Del. 1970), appeal withdrawn, (3d Cir., Aug. 25, 1970). See Note, Development of the 
Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. REV. 888 (1971). 
39. 307 F. Supp. at 1298. 
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against the United Fruit Company contain an express provision that 
whenever parties to the consent decrees can show that restrictive prac-
tices agreed to and employed by them, are required by foreign law and 
are undertaken as the result of compulsion by foreign governments, the 
companies are not subject to attacks by American antitrust authori-
ties.~11 The importance of these precedents to the Arab oil embargo is 
self-evident. 
B. Sovereign Immunity 
Sovereign immunity is essentially a procedural concept protecting 
foreign states from suit in U.S. courts. In the Oil Cartel grand jury 
investigation of 1952-53, a British oil company moved to quash a sub-
poena duces tecum served upon it on the ground that it was an instru-
mentality of the British government and therefore immune from suit. 
The district court agreed because the British government owned 35 
percent of the total capital of the company and because the object and 
purpose of the corporation made it "indistinguishable" from the Gov-
ernment of Great Britain.41 Here again the relevance of this decision to 
the topic under discussion is obvious. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There are several other pertinent issues which I hope we will review 
during the course of this symposium. Two of the most interesting are 
the relevance of the "act of state" doctrine42 and the point made by 
George Ball and others that it is at least a minor paradox that the 
American Government has reacted strongly to the Arab's "oil black-
mail" while simultaneously continuing its own embargoes against coun-
tries such as Cuba and Rhodesia. 43 
40. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 1969 Trade Cas. ~ 72,743, at 
86,656 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1970). See H. KRONSTEIN, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 
455-58 (1973). 
41. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 288-91 (D.D.C. 1952). 
S ee FUGATE, supra note 21, at § 3.10. 
42. See Victor, Multinational Corporations: Antitrust Extraterritoriality and the 
Prospect of Immunity, 8 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 11 (1973). 
43. Ball, Your Evil Embargo; Our Purity of Purpose, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1974, 
at 41, cols. 5-6. 
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